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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of book-tax conformity level on the
relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness.
Different from Frank et al. (2009) and Lennox et al. (2013), this study considers endogeneity
problem to minimize biased results. Using the companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange
for 2013-2016, this study found that there is endogeneity problem in the relationship between tax
reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness, but no causality relationship. In
this case, only tax reporting aggressiveness that affects financial reporting aggressiveness, but
not otherwise. Consistent with the hypothesis, this study also found that firm with a low level of
BTC is more weakened trade-offs between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting
aggressiveness than firm with high level of BTC. These results are consistent either with or
without include the industry dummy.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness
and financial reporting aggressiveness. Specifically, this study aims to examine the effect of
book-tax conformity (BTC) level on the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and
financial reporting aggressiveness. Conceptually, financial reporting aggressiveness is defined as
upward earnings management. Meanwhile, tax reporting aggressiveness is defined as effort to
downward taxable income.
The relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial tax aggressiveness is
interesting to investigate for two reasons. The first reason, there are two research streams that
test this relationship. The first stream focuses on testing whether tax reporting aggressiveness
affects financial reporting aggressiveness (Dhaliwal et al., 2004; Frank et al., 2009; Wang &
Chen, 2012). From the investors' point of view, tax reporting aggressiveness is an activity that
maximizing firm value (Kim et al., 2011). As residual claimants, shareholders tend to ask
manager to do tax avoidance, so they can increase earnings after tax that will be received,
through dividends. To align the shareholders’ interest, tax avoidance activity can be used as a
justification for managers to manage earnings (Desai & Dharmapala, 2009).
In contrast, the second stream focuses on testing whether financial reporting
aggressiveness affects tax reporting aggressiveness (Frank et al., 2009; Lennox et al., 2012).
Dhaliwal et al. (2004) states that when a company has an incentive to achieve a certain earnings
target (e.g. to meet or beat analysts' forecast earnings), current tax expense accounts can be the
last opportunity to make earnings management. However, managers can also decide to pay taxes
based on earnings overstatement that have been reported in the financial statements. It is done to
avoid the suspicion from savvy investors, capital market authorities, and the tax authorities
(Erickson, et al, 2004; Desai, 2005; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). However, current research
has not considered the endogeneity problem. If there is endogeneity problem and it is not solved,
then it can cause the biased result. This biased result can be reflected in inconclusive results at
previous research.
The second reason, the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial
reporting aggressiveness is also highly depend on BTC level. According to Shackelford and
Shevlin (2001), the trade-offs of tax reporting and financial reporting faced by managers occur
because apply the high BTC level. In otherwise, managers that do not face trade-offs occur
because apply low BTC level (Desai, 2002; Manzon & Plesko, 2002; Mills et al., 2002; Boynton
et al., 2005; Hanlon et al., 2005; Frank et al., 2009). However, there is no empirical evidence that
show whether vary BTC level affect the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and
financial reporting aggressiveness.
Using a sample of companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for 2013-2016, this
study aims to fill the gap of previous research (Frank et al., 2009; Lennox et al., 2013). Frank et
al., 2009 examines the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting
aggressiveness using ordinary least squares (OLS). If the study indicates any endogeneity
problem, then OLS may provide biased results. Different from Frank et al. (2009), this study will
examine the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting
aggressiveness using two-stage least squares (2SLS) to minimize the biased results.
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In addition, this study also examines the relationship between tax reporting
aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness across different BTC level. According to
Atwood, et al. (2010), the diversity of tax reporting will reflect level of diversity of taxable
income permitted by taxation authorities in a country. The diversity of tax reporting will also
reflect the extent of BTC levels permitted by a country. Therefore, this study only used data in
one country, Indonesia, BTC level is measured by conformity between accounting standards and
tax laws are allowed across industries. Previous studies have not shown empirical evidence
related to the impact of BTC levels on the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and
financial reporting aggressiveness. We predict that the higher BTC level, firm is likely to face
trade-offs when making financial reporting and tax reporting (Shackelford & Shevlin, 2001).
Instead, we predict that the lower BTC level, firm has opportunity to make tax reporting
aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness in the same period (Desai, 2002; Manzon
& Plesko, 2002; Mills et al., 2002; Boynton et al., 2005 ; Hanlon et al., 2005; Frank et al., 2009).
This study contributes to the literature examining the relationship between tax reporting
aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness. This study found that there is endogeneity
problem in the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting
aggressiveness, but no causality relationship. In this case, only tax reporting aggressiveness that
affects financial reporting aggressiveness, but not otherwise.
In accordance with the predictions, this study also found that firm with a low level of
BTC is more weakened trade-offs between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting
aggressiveness than firm with high level of BTC. These results are consistent either with or
without include the industry dummy. These results support previous research.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. This paper will discuss the theoretical
foundation and some previous research to develop the hypothesis. In the next section of this
study will discuss the research design. Furthermore, we will present some of the findings in this
study. Finally, this study will present conclusions, limitations of research, and development for
future research.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Relationship between Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Financial Reporting
Aggressiveness
There are two research streams that test the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness
and financial reporting aggressiveness. The first stream focuses on testing whether tax reporting
aggressiveness affects financial reporting aggressiveness (Dhaliwal et al., 2004; Frank et al.,
2009; Wang & Chen, 2012). From the investors' point of view, tax reporting aggressiveness is an
activity that maximizing firm value (Kim et al., 2011). As residual claimants, shareholders tend
to ask manager to do tax avoidance, so they can increase earnings after tax that will be received,
through dividends. To align the shareholders’ interest, tax avoidance activity can be used as a
justification for managers to manage earnings (Desai & Dharmapala, 2009). However, current
research has not considered the endogeneity problem. If there is endogeneity problem and it is
not solved, then it can cause the biased result. This biased result can be reflected in conclusive
results at previous research.
However, that explanation has not considered the possibility of agency problem between
managers as agents and shareholders as principals. In Jensen & Meckling (1976), managers also
have an interest in maximizing their own well-being. Thus, it is possible for managers to not
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always act aligned with interests of shareholders for several reasons (Desai & Dharmapala,
2009). First, manager needs large effort to make tax reporting aggressiveness. Managers should
study the loopholes of tax regulations and apply them in day-to-day corporate transactions.
Second, managers with risk-averse type do not want to imply tax reporting aggressiveness
strategy because it can be detected by tax authorities and it have potential to be given sanctions.
In contrast, the second stream focuses on testing whether financial reporting
aggressiveness affects tax reporting aggressiveness (Frank et al., 2009; Lennox et al., 2012).
Dhaliwal et al. (2004) states that when a company has an incentive to achieve a certain earnings
target (e.g. to meet or beat analysts' forecast earnings), current tax expense accounts can be the
last opportunity to make earnings management. However, managers can also decide to pay taxes
based on earnings overstatement that have been reported in the financial statements. It is done to
avoid the suspicion from savvy investors, capital market authorities, and the tax authorities
(Erickson, et al, 2004; Desai, 2005; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006).
Erickson et al. (2004) describe four potential tax treatment that can be applied by the
manager when the company overstated earnings in its financial reporting. First, management
may choose not to report the overstated earnings report the company and classifies tax on
temporary differences between accounting standards and tax regulations. Second, manager can
ignore overstated earnings from taxable income and classifies them as permanent differences
between accounting standards and tax regulations. Third, manager can report the overstated
earnings in tax reporting. Fourth, managers can report fictitious earnings on their financial
statements and then as if paying taxes by the actual amount.
The current research has not considered the endogeneity problem. If there is endogeneity
problem and it is not solved, then it can cause the biased result. This biased result can be
reflected in inconclusive results at previous research. In general, managers may face trade-offs
when making tax reporting and financial reporting (Shackelford & Shevlin, 2001). Managers
deciding to upward earnings management in the financial reporting may incur tax costs to report
higher book income. Similarly, manager deciding to downward taxable income to tax authorities
may report lower income to shareholders and thereby incur financial reporting costs. In other
words, financial reporting aggressiveness have negative impact on tax reporting aggressiveness,
and vice versa.
Lennox et al. (2013) also found that the impact of tax reporting aggressiveness on the
probability of firm with accounting fraud is negative and significant. This impact is caused by
the increasing of opportunity to be monitored by tax authorities (Erickson, et al 2004). Dhaliwal
et al. (2004) showed that firm will tend to reduce tax avoidance measures to meet or beat
analysts' forecasts earnings.
In contrast, Desai (2005) states that manager's decision to make tax reporting
aggressiveness and fraud will tend to occur simultaneously. Desai (2003) proved that the
companies involved in tax shelters, tend to increase the accounting earnings. Frank et al. (2009)
found that financial reporting aggressiveness have a positive impact on tax reporting
aggressiveness, and vice versa. Based on previous research, we predict that there is an
endogeneity problem in the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial
reporting aggressiveness.
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Relationship between Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Financial Reporting
Aggressiveness across BTC Levels
Based on previous research, the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial
reporting aggressiveness is also highly depend on BTC level. Shackelford & Shevlin (2001)
explains that theoretically trade-offs of tax reporting and financial reporting faced by managers
can occur due to apply high level of BTC. In otherwise, managers that do not face trade-offs of
tax reporting and financial reporting can occur due to apply low level of BTC (Desai, 2002;
Manzon & Plesko, 2002; Mills et al., 2002; Boynton et al., 2005; Hanlon et Al., 2005; Frank et
al., 2009). However, there is no empirical evidence that show whether vary BTC level affect the
relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness.
According to Atwood, et al. (2010), the diversity of tax reporting will reflect level of
diversity of taxable income permitted by taxation authorities in a country. The diversity of tax
reporting will also reflect the extent of BTC levels permitted by a country. Mills & Newberry
(2001) proves that firms with incentives for earnings management have low level of BTC. The
magnitude of the difference between accounting earnings and taxable income can be a signal of
low earnings quality for financial statements users (Chaney & Jeter, 1994; Joos et al., 2002;
Hanlon, 2003a). Firm with high level of BTC have higher earnings quality than firms with low
level of BTC (Hanlon, 2005).
Based on previous studies, we predict that the higher BTC level, firm is likely to face
trade-offs when making financial reporting and tax reporting (Shackelford & Shevlin, 2001).
Instead, we predict that the lower BTC level, firm has opportunity to make tax reporting
aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness in the same period (Desai, 2002; Manzon
& Plesko, 2002; Mills et al., 2002; Boynton et al., 2005 ; Hanlon et al., 2005; Frank et al., 2009).
Thus, the hypothesis developed in this study is:
H1: Firm with low level of BTC is more weakened trade-offs between tax reporting
aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness than firm with high level of BTC.
RESEARCH METHODS
Data and Sample
This study uses companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Indonesia was chosen as the
setting of research because the level of protection of investors in Indonesia is relatively lower
than other countries (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Doidge, et al., 2007; Klapper and Love, 2004;
Mitton, 2002; Claessens et al., 2000). Thus, it appropriate setting to examine the relationship
between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness.
Data are taken from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database in the period 2013 to 2016. For
data that are not available in database, we collect data manually from the financial statements
downloaded from the official website of Indonesia Stock Exchange, namely www.idx.co.id.
Industry classification is based on two-digit GICS code.
We selected the sample based on several criteria. First, we exclude firm that specifically
regulated in taxation (e.g. Final Income Tax Payers and firm in the financial industry). Second,
an industry at least consist of ten companies. Third, we exclude firm with incomplete data.
Lastly, we exclude firm at 1% top and bottom of the sample to solve the outliers. The final
sample consists of 1.212 firm-years or 303 firms. Table 1 presents the description of the sample
used in this study based on the composition of industry.
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Table 1
Sample Description: Industrial Composition
Dua-digit GICS code
10
15
20
25
30
35
45
50
Total

Sektor Industri
Energy
Materials
Industrials
Consumer Discretionary
Consumer Staples
Health Care
Information Technology
Telecommunication Services

Jml. Observasi
144
232
200
304
196
52
40
44
1.212

Measurement of Tax Reporting Aggressiveness
The measurement of tax reporting aggressiveness is following Frank et al. (2009). We consider
firms to have aggressive tax reporting if they have high discretionary permanent book-tax
differences. According to Frank et al. (2009), permanent book-tax differences are better measure
than otherwise (such as total effective tax rates (ETRs), cash ETRs, total discretionary book-tax
differences) for several reasons. First, permanent differences are more consistent with anecdotal
evidence regarding the nature of aggressive tax shelter activity. Second, the permanent
differences are more comparable to total accruals. Third, the measurement of tax reporting
aggressiveness using temporary differences and cash ETRs could be correlated with the
measurement of financial reporting aggressiveness. It may cause bias results.
There is equation used to estimate discretionary permanent differences (DTAX) which has
been adjusted to the accounting standards and tax regulations in Indonesia:
∆
(1)
where:
PERMDIFFit = Total book-tax differences less temporary book-tax differences for firm i in year
t (PTBIit - (CTEit / STRit) - (DTEit / STRit).
PTBIit
= Pre-tax book income for firm i in year t.
= Current income tax expense of firm i in year t.
CTEit
= Income Tax Rates in year t, 25%.
STRit
DTEit
= Deferred tax expense for firm i in year t.
= Goodwill and other intangible assets for firm i in year t.
INTANGit
= Changes in net operating loss carryforwards for firm i in year t.
ΔNOLit
LAGPERMit = One-year lagged PERMDIFF for firm i in year t.
= Discretionary permanent difference (DTAXit) for company i in year t.
εit
To control firm size, all variables above are scaled by the average total assets in year t-1 and year
t. Equation (1) are estimated for each industry-year based on two-digit GICS code. Table 2
presents the average estimation result of equation (1).
In equation (1), we include variable to control nondiscretionary permanent differences
not related to tax planning (such INTANGit). Meanwhile, ΔNOLit variable is controlled for
changes in net operating loss carryforwards related to the change in the valuation allowance
account that impact on PERMDIFF but not related to tax planning. Finally, we include
permanent nondiscretionary LAGPERM to control persistent differences over time. Thus, the
residual (ε) from the equation (1) can be used as a proxy for discretionary permanent differences
(DTAX).
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Table 2
Estimation Results of Tax Reporting Aggressiveness
∆

(2)
Coefficient
‐0,006**
‐0,004
0,632***
0,451***
22,2%

Intercept
INTANGit
ΔNOLit
LAGPERMit
Adjusted R2
Notes:
*, **, *** are significant at the 90%, 95%, 99% confidence level.
The dependent variable is PERMDIFFit that measured by total book‐tax
differences deducting temporary differences for firm i in year t. INTANGit is
goodwill and other intangible assets for firm i in year t. ΔNOLit is the
change in net operating loss carryforwards for firm i in year t. LAGPERM is
a one‐year lagged PERMDIFF for firm i in year t. ε is discretionary
permanent difference (DTAX it) for company i in year t.

Measurement of Financial Reporting Aggressiveness
We measure financial reporting aggressiveness with modified-Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995)
as follows:
∆
(2)
∆
where:
TACCit
= Total accruals (PTBIit - (CFOit + ITPit) for firm i in year t.
= Cash flow from operations for firm i in year t.
CFOit
ITPit
= Income taxes paid for firm i in year t.
= Changes in sales for firm i of year t-1 to year t.
ΔREVit
= Changes in accounts receivables for firm i from year t-1 to year t.
ΔARit
PPEit
= Gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i in year t.
= Discretionary accruals (DFIN) for company i in year t.
ηit
To control firm size, all variables above are scaled by the average total assets in year t-1 and year
t. Equation (2) are estimated for each industry-year based on two-digit GICS code. This study
uses pre-tax accruals in the TACC to eliminate the possibility of correlation with tax reporting
aggressiveness. Table 3 presents the average estimation result of equation (2).
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Table 3
Estimation Result of Financial Reporting Aggressiveness
∆

∆

(3)
Coefficient
‐0,012
0,138***
‐0,056***
4,0%

Intercept
(ΔREVit ‐ ΔARit)
PPEit
Adjusted R2
Notes:
*, **, *** are significant at the 90%, 95%, 99% confidence level.
The dependent variable is the TACCit that measured by pre‐tax total
accruals for firm i in year t. ΔREVit is the change in sales for the company i
of year t‐1 to year t. ΔARit is a change in accounts receivable for the
company i of year t‐1 to year t. PPEit is gross property, plant, and
equipment for firm i in year t. ηit is discretionary accruals (DFIN) for
company i in year t.

Measurement of BTC Subsample
To examine whether the different level of BTC is affect on the relationship between tax reporting
aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness, we measure the level of BTC following
Atwood et al. (2010). According to Atwood, et al. (2010), the diversity of tax reporting will
reflect level of diversity of taxable income permitted by taxation authorities in a country. The
diversity of tax reporting will also reflect the extent of BTC levels permitted by a country.
Therefore, this study only used data in one country, Indonesia, BTC level is measured by
conformity between accounting standards and tax laws are allowed across industries. Thus, we
measure the level of BTC based on the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) of equation (3) below:
(3)
To control firm size, all variables above are scaled by the average total assets in year t-1 and year
t. Equation (3) are estimated for each industry-year based on two-digit GICS code.
In accordance with the explanation before, RMSE indicates management discretion in
differential between financial reporting and tax reporting, either higher or lower. The larger
RMSE, the lower level of BTC. Conversely, the smaller RMSE, the higher level of BTC. The
subsample was obtained by rank the RMSE in each industry-year from the lowest to the highest
value. We measured small BTC (SBTC) variable as a dummy variable in which "1" for firm with
RMSE values that greater than median in year t, and "0" for otherwise.
For robustness check, we uses RankBTC variables measured by descending ranks where
the highest value of RSME in year t is ranked as 0 and the lowest value of RSME in year t is
ranked as n-1 (in this case n is the number of industries in year t). As Atwood et al. (2010), we
then scaled the rankings with n-1 to rank it between 0 and 1. The greater RankBTC, the higher
level of BTC. Conversely, the smaller RankBTC, the lower level of BTC.
Research Model
The model in this study is developed from Frank et al. (2009). Different from Frank et al. (2009),
we examines the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting
aggressiveness by using 2SLS. Because of there are indications of endogeneity problem, the
using OLS can provide biased results. There is the basic model used in this study:
_
(4)
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(5)

∆

where:
PTROAit

= Pre-tax book income for firm i in year t divided by average total assets year t
and t-1.
= Dummy variable, where "1" if the NOL carryforwards for firm i in year t-1 is
NOL_Dit
greater than 0, and "0" for otherwise.
LEVit
= Total debt firm i in year t divided by average total assets year t and t-1.
= Change in operating cash flows before income tax paid for firm i between year t
ΔPTCFOit
and t-1 divided by the average total assets of year t and t-1.
SIZEit
= Natural log of total assets for firm i in year t.
In equation (4) and (5), we included control variables associated with the incentive to tax
plan (PTROAit, NOL_Dit, and LEVit), the incentive to manage earnings (ΔPTCFOit), and firm size
(SIZEit). However, to ensure their endogeneity problem, this study did endogeneity test and
Granger causality test first. Based on the results of endogeneity test, it is known that there is
endogenous problem in the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial
reporting aggressiveness. However based on Granger causality test results in Table 4, we know
that there is no causality relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial
reporting aggressiveness. In this case, only tax reporting aggressiveness that affects on financial
reporting aggressiveness, but not otherwise.
Table 4
Granger Causality Test Results
Null Hypothesis
F-statistics
Prob.
0,481
0,619
DFINit does not Granger cause DTAXit
0,059
0,059**
DTAXit does not Granger cause DFINit
Notes:
*, **, *** are significant at the 90%, 95%, 99% confidence level.
DFINit is discretionary accruals for form i in year t. DTAXit is
discretionary permanent difference for firm i in year t.

Because of any endogeneity problem, this research will solve it by using 2SLS. Equation
(4) is the first-stage regression that estimates the predicted value of tax reporting aggressiveness
(DTAX). Equation (5) is the second-stage regression that estimates the relation between predicted
tax reporting aggressiveness (PDTAX) and financial reporting aggressiveness (DFIN). The
estimation results of equations (4) and (5) are presented in Table 5. Table 5 Panel A shows the
first-stage of regression and Table 5 Panel B shows the second-stage of regression.
In Table 5 Panel B it is known that tax reporting aggressiveness is positively and
significantly affects financial reporting aggressiveness. These results support previous research
that firms have the opportunity to making financial reporting aggressiveness and tax reporting
aggressiveness in the same period (Desai, 2002; Manzon & Plesko, 2002; Mills et al., 2002;
Boynton et al., 2005; Hanlon et al ., 2005; Frank et al., 2009). These results may be supported by
the level of investor protection in Indonesia that relatively lower than other countries (Claessens
& Yurtoglu, 2013; Doidge, et al., 2007; Klapper & Love, 2004; Mitton, 2002; Claessens et al.,
2000).
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Table 5
Relationship between Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Financial Reporting
Aggressiveness (2SLS)
∆

_

(4)
(5)

Panel A: First‐stage
Coefficient
‐0,018
0,106***
0,125***
‐0,008
‐0,004
0,001
1.212
11,4%

Intercept
DFINit
PTROAit
NOL_Dit
LEVit
SIZEit
Observation
Adjusted‐R2
Panel B: Second‐stage

Coefficient
Intercept
‐0,589***
PDTAXit
4,662***
ΔPTCFOit
‐0,226***
SIZEit
0,021***
1.212
Observation
88,7%
Adjusted‐R2
Notes:
*, **, *** are significant at the 90%, 95%, 99% confidence level.
The dependent variable in the Panel A is DTAXit that measured by discretionary
permanent difference for firm i in year t. The dependent variable in the Panel B is
DFINit that measured by discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. PDTAXit is
predicted value in equation (4) for firm i in year t. PTROAit is pre‐tax book income
for firm i in year t divided by average total assets in year t and t‐1. NOL_Dit is
dummy variable, where "1" if the NOL carryforwards for firm i in year t‐1 is
greater than 0, and "0" for otherwise. LEVit is total debt firm i in year t divided by
average total assets in year t and t‐1. ΔPTCFOit is change in operating cash flows
before income tax paid for firm i between year t and t‐1 divided by the average
total assets of year t and t‐1. SIZEit is a natural log of total assets for firm i in year
t.

To testing H1, equation (5) was developed to show how the relationship between tax
reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness across level of BTC. The
following is the equation used:
∗
∆
(6)
where:
PDTAXit
= Predicted value in equation (4) for firm i in year t.
= Dummy variable, where "1" is firm with low level of BTC, and "0" for
SBTCit
otherwise.
According to H1, we predict that firm with low level of BTC has opportunity to prepare
financial reporting aggressiveness and tax reporting aggressiveness in the same period (Desai,
2002; Manzon & Plesko, 2002; Mills et al., 2002; Boynton et al., 2005; Hanlon et al., 2005;
Frank et al., 2009). Meanwhile, firm with high levels of BTC are likely to face trade-offs when
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making financial reporting and tax reporting (Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001). Therefore, we
predicts that coefficient β3 in equation (6) is positive and significant.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
In Table 6 Panel A is known that mean of DFINit is 0,004 and its median is 0,006. It indicates
that most of firms in the samples are financial reporting aggressiveness. The mean of PDTAXit is
-0,001 and its median is -0,002. It indicates that most of firms in the sample are less aggressive
in tax reporting. Nevertheless, the maximum value of PDTAXit indicates that there are still firm
that report taxes aggressively. The mean of ΔPTCFOit and SIZEit are 0,009 and 28,463. While
the mean and median of SBTCit is 0,573 and 1,000. It indicates that 57.3% of firms in industries
with low level of BTC.
In Table 6 Panel B is known that mean of DTAXit in the high level of BTC is significantly
different from mean of DTAXit in the low level of BTC. In this case, firms with high level of
BTC are more likely to make tax reporting aggressively than firms with low level of BTC. In
Table 6 Panel B is also known that the mean of DFINit in the high level of BTC is significantly
different from the mean of DFINit in the low level of BTC. Firms with high level of BTC are
more likely to make financial reporting aggressively than firms with low level of BTC.
Table 6 Panel C shows the relationship between variables used in this study. PDTAXit is
positively and significantly correlated with DFINit. This is an early indication that the greater tax
reporting aggressiveness, the greater financial reporting aggressiveness. However, we still need
to test its relations to find out how the influence of tax reporting aggressiveness on financial
reporting aggressiveness.
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
DFINit
PDTAXit
ΔPTCFOit
SIZEit
SBTCit
0,537
28,463
0,009
-0,001
0,004
Mean
1,000
28,451
0,007
-0,002
0,006
Median
1,000
33,199
0,985
0,131
0,679
Maximum
0,000
22,758
-1,514
-0,179
-0,767
Minimum
0,499
1,668
0,130
0,022
0,109
Std. Dev.
Panel B: DTAXit and DFINit across Level of BTC
Mean
Sig. F-test
SBTCit = 1 SBTCit = 0
-0,004
0,002
p < 0,01***
DTAXit
0,000
0.008
p < 0,01***
DFINit
Panel C: Pearson Correlation
DFINit
PDTAXit
ΔPTCFOit
SIZEit
SBTCit
1,000
DFINit
1,000
0,766a
PDTAXit
1,000
ΔPTCFOit
-0,472
-0,190
-0,006
-0,028
1,000
SIZEit
-0,085
1,000
-0,039
-0,014
0,005
0,001
SBTCit
Notes:
a
Bold show the significant correlation.
DFINit is discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. PDTAXit is predicted value in
equation (4) for firm i in year t. ΔPTCFOit is change in operating cash flows before
income tax paid for firm i between year t and t-1 divided by the average total assets
of year t and t-1. SIZEit is a natural log of total assets for firm i in year t. SBTCit is
dummy variable, where “1” if firm with low level of BTC, and “0” for otherwise.

Regression Analysis
In Table 7 Panel A, the result of univariate test is show that PDTAXit has a positive and
significant effect on DFINit either at high level of BTC or low level of BTC. Although in Table 6
Panel B is known that firms with high level of BTC are more likely to make tax reporting
aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness, but in Table 7 Panel A is well known that
the impact of PDTAXit on DFINit in the low level of BTC is more positive and significant than in
high level of BTC. The adjusted-R2 of firms with low level of BTC is greater than firms with
high level of BTC. This is an early indication that firms with low level of BTC more weaken
trade-offs between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness than firms
with high level of BTC, consistent with H1.
In Table 7 Panel B, we tested whether different level of BTC had an significant effect on
the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness.
Table 7 Panel B column (1) shows that the coefficient PDTAXit* SBTCit (β3) has a positive and
significant effect on DFINit. In accordance with predictions, firm with low level of BTC more
weakened trade-offs between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness
than firms with high level of BTC levels. This is supported by the value of β1 (firm with high
level of BTC) which is smaller and significant than the value of β1+β3 (firm with low level of
BTC) on Wald-test. Thus, H1 is proven. These results support previous research. According to
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001), the trade-offs of tax reporting and financial reporting faced by
managers occur because apply the high BTC level. In otherwise, managers that do not face tradeoffs occur because apply low BTC level (Desai, 2002; Manzon & Plesko, 2002; Mills et al.,
2002; Boynton et al., 2005; Hanlon et al., 2005; Frank et al., 2009).
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Because of BTC level are measured at industry level, this study also includes industry
dummy variables to ensure that differential impact of tax reporting aggressiveness on financial
reporting aggressiveness across different level of BTC are not caused by industrial factors. Table
7 Panel B column (2) shows that the coefficient PDTAX it*SBTCit (β3) still has a positive and
significant influence on DFINit, although it has been controlled by industrial dummy variable.
Thus, H1 is proven.
Table 7
Relationship between Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Financial Reporting
Aggressiveness across Level of BTC
∗

∆

(6)

Panel A: Univariate Test
Sign
PDTAXit
Observation
Adjusted R2
Sig. F‐test
Panel B: Multivariate Test

Subsample
SBTCit = 1
SBTCit = 0
3,996***
3,548***
651
561
64,3%
48,4%
p < 0,001***

+

PDTAXit (1) = PDTAXit (0)

Sign
(1)
(2)
Intercept
0,153***
?
0,190***
PDTAXit
3,281***
+/‐
3,254***
SBTCit
‐0,005*
?
‐0,011***
PDTAXit*SBTCit
0,447***
+ (H1)
0,519***
ΔPTCFOit
‐0,283***
‐0,284***
SIZEit
‐0,005***
‐0,005***
Dummy Industri
No
Yes
1.212
Observation
1.212
70,3%
Adjusted R2
71,0%
Wald‐test:
β1=β1+β3
p < 0,01***
p < 0,01***
Notes:
*, **, *** are significant at the 90%, 95%, 99% confidence level.
The dependent variable is DFINit that measured by discretionary accruals for firm i in year t.
PDTAXit is predicted value in equation (4) for firm i in year t. ΔPTCFOit is change in operating
cash flows before income tax paid for firm i between year t and t‐1 divided by the average
total assets of year t and t‐1. SIZEit is a natural log of total assets for firm i in year t. SBTCit is
dummy variable, where “1” if firm with low level of BTC, and “0” for otherwise.

Robustness Check
As explained before, we also conducts robustness checks to ensure that the results in Table 7 are
robust. In this case, we replaces SBTCit variable with RankBTCit. The larger RankBTC, the higher
level of BTC. Conversely, the smaller RankBTC, the lower level of BTC. Thus, equation (6) is
modified as follows:
∗

∆

(7)
where:
RankBTCit = Ranking of BTC for firm i in year t .
In accordance with H1, we predict that the coefficient β3 in equation (7) is negative and
significant. In the higher level of BTC, firm tend to faced trade-offs when making financial
98

Rachmawati & Dwi Martani | Book-Tax Conformity Level on the Relationship between Tax Reporting

reporting and tax reporting (Shackelford & Shevlin, 2001). Conversely, in the lower level of
BTC, firm tends to making financial reporting aggressiveness and tax reporting aggressiveness in
the same period (Desai, 2002; Manzon & Plesko, 2002; Mills et al., 2002; Boynton et al., 2005;
Hanlon et al. , 2005; Frank et al., 2009). Table 8 columns (1) and (2) show that the coefficient
PDTAXit*RankBTCit (β3) is negative and significant effect on DFINit. These results are consistent
with the results presented in Table 7 of Panel B columns (1) and (2). Thus, the model is robust
and supports H1.
Table 8
Robustness Check: Relationship between Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Financial
Reporting Aggressiveness across Level of BTC
∗

Sign
?
+/‐
?
‐ (H1)

∆

(1)
0,145***
3,862***
0,004
‐0,740***
‐0,282***
‐0,005***
No
1.212
70,3%

(7)
(2)
0,172***
3,909***
0,015*
‐0,834***
‐0,283***
‐0,005***
Yes
1.212
71,0%

Intercept
PDTAXit
RankBTCit
PDTAXit*RankBTCit
ΔPTCFOit
SIZEit
Dummy Industry
Observation
Adjusted R2
Wald‐test:
β1=β1+β3
p < 0,01***
p < 0,01***
Notes:
*, **, *** are significant at the 90%, 95%, 99% confidence level.
The dependent variable is DFINit that measured by discretionary accruals for firm i in
year t. PDTAXit is predicted value in equation (4) for firm i in year t. ΔPTCFOit is change
in operating cash flows before income tax paid for firm i between year t and t‐1
divided by the average total assets of year t and t‐1. SIZEit is a natural log of total
assets for firm i in year t. RankBTCit is ranking of BTC for form i in year t.

CONCLUSION
This study was conducted to fill the gap of previous studies. Different from Frank et al. (2009)
and Lennox et al. (2013), this study considers endogeneity problem to minimize biased results.
This study was also examine the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial
reporting aggressiveness across different level of BTC. Using the companies listed on the
Indonesia Stock Exchange, this study found that there is endogeneity problem in the relationship
between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness, but no causality
relationship. In this case, only tax reporting aggressiveness that affects financial reporting
aggressiveness, but not otherwise. In accordance with the predictions, this study also found that
firm with a low level of BTC is more weakened trade-offs between tax reporting aggressiveness
and financial reporting aggressiveness than firm with high level of BTC. These results are
consistent either with or without include the industry dummy. These results support previous
research.
This study has several limitations. First, the period research used is quite short. Second,
the proxy of tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness used in this
study is very limited. For further research is expected to add the period to get better results. In
addition, next research is expected to use some proxy for tax reporting aggressiveness and
financial reporting aggressiveness, for generalization purposes. Finally, further research is
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expected to consider the role of corporate governance on the relationship between tax reporting
aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness.
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